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I. INTRODUCTION
In our society of complex legislative systems and statutory
modification, many times legislators lose sight of the effect that they can
have on an individual’s life. As a result, it can be beneficial when looking at
proposed legislation to put yourself in the shoes of those whose lives it will
impact. Imagine this: You are forty years old. For the past twenty years
you have been happily employed by an Ohio public school district. During
this time you have received nothing but praise and admiration from your
employer as a result of your exemplary work performance. Then one day,
∗
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you receive a knock at your door. Your supervisor steps in and informs you
that, unfortunately, he will have to let you go immediately. You ask why.
Your supervisor informs you that as a result of new legislation, he will have
to discontinue your employment because twenty-two years ago you pleaded
guilty to the sale of marijuana. You are distraught and confused. You
informed your supervisor of this charge when he hired you. You satisfied
all of the requirements of your punishment promptly. You have been a
model citizen and employee for over two decades, as well as the primary
breadwinner for your family. You ask, “what am I going to do now; why
has this happened with little to no warning?” All your employer can say is,
“that’s just the way it is.” As shocking and troubling as this scenario is, this
is exactly what is happening to many public school district employees across
Ohio.
Through the passage of Ohio House Bill 190, and the newly enacted
Revised Code section 3319.391, the state legislators have taken it upon
themselves to bend their constitutional privileges past the breaking point at
the expense of their constituency. In our society, many of us go through
rough patches in our lives. Unfortunately, it is during these times that some
people feel as if they have no other options, and in their darkest moments
they break the law. However, many of them may have had the opportunity
to turn their lives around and become a vital member of not only their larger
communities but also of their close-knit community, consisting of their
friends and family. Sadly, House Bill 190, enacted through Revised Code
section 3319.391, has taken this opportunity away from many individuals by
depriving them of their employment. Worse, their employment has been
terminated due to a past conviction without taking into account the time that
has passed or the lives that the employees have led since that moment of
weakness. Something must be done about this, now.
This Comment will begin in Section II with an examination of the
background of the new additions to the Revised Code by tracking the
development of the Bill into law. Specifically, it will look at how a bill that
began as a restructuring of the school calendar turned into one severely
restricting the hiring practices of public schools throughout Ohio. In doing
this, Section II will begin with an examination of Substitute House Bill 190
and how it amended old sections of the Code while at the same time
enacting new ones. Next, it will discuss the ineffective rehabilitation
standards that are currently in place. Then, it will proceed to examine the
Ohio Legislature’s first attempt at modification in the form of Substitute
House Bill 428. Finally, it will bring to light some of the effects of this
legislation by noting some of the pending class action suits currently being
filed in response.
Section III will examine and evaluate the relevant arguments in
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opposition to the new legislation. In particular, Section III will examine the
legislative arguments that also arise in connection with the modification to
the Revised Code and its inherent flaws. Also, Section III will discuss the
constitutionality of the new legislation by raising several arguments against
its continued existence in its current state. In connection with that
discussion, Section III will discuss a recent Ohio Supreme Court case and its
decision as to the constitutional validity of the new legislation. Finally,
Section III will propose possible solutions to the problems raised by the new
legislation by looking at how other states handle background checks in a
school setting. Section IV will conclude the Comment by looking at the
probable outcomes if nothing is done, and recommend alternative strategies
to restructure the laws in order to conform to the overall public policies and
purposes given by the legislature for the adoption of these bills.
II. BACKGROUND
In examining the newly enacted Ohio Revised Code section
3319.391, it is useful to start at the beginning and trace the steps that were
taken in its development from two bills into current law. First, this section
will examine Substitute House Bill 190, which created and enacted section
3319.391, specifically looking at the development of this Bill as it passed
through both houses and the fiscal impact that will likely result. Second,
this section will look at Substitute House Bill 428, which demonstrated the
legislature’s first realization that modification of section 3319.391 may be
needed, and the steps that were taken.
A. Substitute House Bill 190: The Beginning of the Change
Substitute House Bill 190 began its life when it was introduced in
the Ohio House of Representatives on April 26, 2007.1 As introduced, the
Bill did not deal with background checks or any other employee restrictions
in even the slightest detail.2 In fact, the only topic that was given any detail
was elementary state achievement tests.3 Specifically, as introduced, the
Bill only sought to revise the scheduling of these tests, as well as the
procedure for submitting the results of these tests to the applicable state
scoring companies.4
House Bill 190 stayed in this same form and substance for much of
its early development. In fact, little to no changes were made from the time
it was introduced until it was passed by the House on June 26, 2007.5 The
1

OHIO LEGIS. SERV. COMM’N, H.B. 190: AS REPORTED BY H. EDUCATION, H.127, Reg. Sess., at 3
(2007).
2
See OHIO LEGIS. SERV. COMM’N, H.B. 190: AS INTRODUCED, H.127, Reg. Sess., at 1 (2007).
3
Id.
4
Id.
5
OHIO LEGIS. SERV. COMM’N, H.B. 190: AS PASSED BY THE HOUSE, H.127, Reg. Sess., at 4 (2007).
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only noticeable changes made were that more detail was provided on the
achievement tests and the lists of sponsors in support of the Bill grew.6
Thus, it is clear that as this Bill progressed through the House the last thing
on any of the representatives’ minds was revisiting and expanding upon the
current background check requirements that were already in place.
However, this would soon change as the Bill began to make its way through
the State Senate.
As the Bill made its way through the Senate, it was primarily
examined and amended by the collective of the Senate Education
Committee.7 The Committee examined the Bill for some time, not reporting
it until October 31, 2007.8 During this time, it is clear that substantial
amending occurred, altering the once achievement-test-based Bill to
resemble the employment-restricting Bill that eventually became law.
Presumably, it was in the Senate Education Committee that the topic of
school district background checks was first brought to light.
As reported by the Senate Education Committee, the most important
change was that the Bill “[r]equire[d] school districts, educational service
centers, community schools, STEM schools, and chartered nonpublic
schools to request criminal records checks for all job applicants and
employees, not merely those whose duties entail the care of children.”9 The
new amendments also “[r]equire[d] private contractors hired by those
employers to request criminal records checks for job applicants and
employees who will work in schools.”10 In addition, the amendments
required that these checks re-occur subsequently in five-year increments,
unless the employee is currently subjected to other subsequent records
checks occurring after the date of employment.11 Finally, the amendments
required both the initial and subsequent checks to involve checks of both
FBI and state records.12 It is also interesting to note that the Senate
Committee declared an emergency without giving further detail to what the
“emergency” dealt with.13 This “emergency” would later lead to, and aid in,
the swift enactment of the final Bill and its effective date.
Though these changes seem minor, they are actually quite
expansive. Prior to these amendments, the old law would only require
records checks in two instances. First, the State Board of Education was
6

Id. at 1.
OHIO LEGIS. SERV. COMM’N, H.B. 190: AS REPORTED BY SENATE EDUC. COMM., S.127, Reg.
Sess., at 15 (2007).
8
OHIO LEGIS. SERV. COMM’N, H.B. 190: AS PASSED BY THE GEN. ASSEMBLY, Reg. Sess., at 12
(2007).
9
OHIO LEGIS. SERV. COMM’N, H.B. 190: AS REPORTED BY SENATE EDUC. COMM., Reg. Sess., at 2
(emphasis added).
10
Id.
11
Id.
12
Id.
13
Id. at 3.
7
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previously required to do a criminal records check of “each person applying
for or renewing an educator license or permit, an educational aide permit, or
a pupil-activity program permit (for extracurricular coaches).”14 Second,
“[i]ndividuals applying for employment . . . [had to] submit to a criminal
records check if applying for a position that is responsible for the care,
custody, or control of children.”15 Under the prior law, the records checks
were mainly concerned with those individuals whose job duties entailed
physical interaction and control of the children. Furthermore, the prior law
did not seem as concerned with those individuals who were already
employed, and this avoided any ex post facto or retroactive constitutional
issues. Also, under the prior law, accompanying FBI checks were not
mandatory, as seen in the “may” versus “must” language.16
Interestingly, the next stage saw the Bill reported by the Senate
Education Committee and unanimously passed by the Senate as a whole on
the same day. The aforementioned amendments were all included,
modifying the requirements for records checks.17 Finally, the following
language was added to make things clear:
[T]he act explicitly prohibits an employer from hiring or
continuing to employ any person whose criminal records
check reveals a conviction of or plea of guilty to any crime
that disqualifies an individual for employment with a public
or chartered nonpublic school, unless the person meets the
State Board’s rehabilitation standards.18
Also, due to the Senate-declaring it an emergency, the Bill became effective
November 17, 2007.19 This was after the House concurred in the Senate
amendments by a ninety-six to one vote on November 7, 2007.20
These new legislative decisions not only caused major changes to
the law, but also had a potential financial impact as well. From the time
Substitute House Bill 190 was introduced until it passed the House, the Bill
involved no direct fiscal impact on either the state or the local school
districts.21 However, this was no longer the case after the Bill made its way
through the Senate Education Committee’s amendments. After revision to
the prior records check requirements, “[t]he Attorney General’s Bureau of
Criminal Identification and Investigation (BCII) [will] likely experience an
annual revenue gain for performing additional records checks of school
14

Id. at 7.
Id. at 8 (emphasis added).
Id. at 9.
17
Id. at 8-10.
18
Id. at 10 (emphasis added).
19
Id. at 1.
20
Id. at 15.
21
OHIO LEGIS. SERV. COMM’N, H.B 190: FISCAL NOTE AND LOCAL IMPACT STATEMENT, AS
REPORTED BY HOUSE EDUC. COMM., H.127, Reg. Sess., at 1 (2007).
15
16
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employees.”22 This is due to the fact that, effective January 1, 2008, BCII
increased its fee for state criminal records checks from $15 to $22.23 Likely,
this was in anticipation of the increased inflow of these requests that they
would be receiving. On top of that, individuals would also have to pay an
additional $24 for the FBI records check.24 Therefore, as a result of
Substitute House Bill 190, the state is ultimately getting increased cash
inflow, while its citizens and institutions are forced to expel additional
money. However, the legislature attempts to justify this fact by stating that
“[a]ny gain in revenue [to] the BCII would likely be offset by an increase in
expenditures related to performing these criminal records checks.”25
B. H.B. 190’s Effects: Amending Ohio Revised Code Section 3319.39 and
Enacting Section 3319.391
Substitute House Bill 190 had its first major effect on Ohio law by
amending Ohio Revised Code section 3319.39. The Bill’s major impact
came in the form of expanding the class of individuals required to undergo a
records check. As noted before, the Bill deleted the language from section
3319.39 requiring the individual to be “a person responsible for the care,
custody, or control of a child” before a records check is mandated.26 Now,
the statute reads, “the appointing or hiring officer of the board of education
of a school district . . . shall request the superintendent of the [BCII] to
conduct a criminal records check with respect to any applicant who has
applied . . . for employment in any position.”27 The Bill also added, “[t]he
appointing or hiring officer shall request that the superintendent include
information from the federal bureau of investigation in the criminal records
check.”28 This new provision clearly reviewed and deleted the former
discretionary language of section 3319.39, dealing with FBI checks.29
The largest effect of H.B. 190 came in the form of the newly
enacted Ohio Revised Code section 3319.391.30 The legislature clearly
intended this new section to reach those non-licensed individuals that
previously did not have to endure the records check requirement. This is
evident from the opening language that “[t]his section applies to any person
hired by a school district . . . in any position that does not require a
‘license.’”31 The statute then went on to say, as to individuals hired on or
22
OHIO LEGIS. SERV. COMM’N, H.B. 190: FISCAL NOTE AND LOCAL IMPACT STATEMENT, AS
ENACTED, H. 127, Reg. Sess., at 1 (2007).
23
Id. at 4.
24
Id.
25
Id. at 1 (emphasis added).
26
H.B. 190, 127th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2007).
27
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3319.39(A)(1) (West 2005 & Supp. 2010) (emphasis added).
28
Id.
29
H.B. 190.
30
Id.
31
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3319.391 (West 2005 & Supp. 2010) (emphasis added).
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after its effective date, “the employer shall request a criminal records check
in accordance with section 3319.39 of the Revised Code and . . . every fifth
year thereafter.”32 Furthermore, for those applicable individuals hired
before the effective date, “the employer shall request a criminal records
check by a date prescribed by the department of education and every fifth
year thereafter.”33 Under the new division (A)(2), section 3319.391 also
applies to “any person hired to work in a school district . . . who is employed
by a private company under contract with the district.”34 These contractor
employees had to undergo the same records checks as new employees, i.e.
prior to hiring and every five years subsequent.35
The most important subsection to come out of the newly created
section 3319.391 would have to be subsection (C), which makes the
following provision:
Any person who is the subject of a criminal records check
under this section and has been convicted of or pleaded
guilty to any offense described in division (B)(1) of section
3319.39 of the Revised Code shall not be hired or shall be
released from employment . . . unless the person meets the
rehabilitation standards adopted by the department under
division (E) of that section.36
The key problem arising from this new subsection is that, now, individuals
who have worked for the school for years, even those not charged with “the
care, custody, or control of a child,” must undergo a records check, and if
they are found to have been convicted of or pleaded guilty to a disqualifying
offense, then they must be fired.

32

Id. at § 3319.391(A) amended by H.B. 428, 127th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2008).
Id.
34
Id. § 3319.391(A)(2) amended by H.B. 428, 127th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2008).
35
Id.
36
Id. § 3319.391(C). The disqualifying offenses under section 3319.39(B)(1) include:
A violation of section 2903.01, 2903.02, 2903.03, 2903.04, 2903.11, 2903.12,
2903.13, 2903.16, 2903.21, 2903.34, 2905.01, 2905.02, 2905.05, 2907.02,
2907.03, 2907.04, 2907.05, 2907.06, 2907.07, 2907.08, 2907.09, 2907.21,
2907.22, 2907.23, 2907.25, 2907.31, 2907.32, 2907.321, 2907.322, 2907.323,
2911.01, 2911.02, 2911.11, 2911.12, 2919.12, 2919.22, 2919.24, 2919.25,
2923.12, 2923.13, 2923.161, 2925.02, 2925.03, 2925.04, 2925.05, 2925.06, or
3716.11 of the Revised Code, a violation of section 2905.04 of the Revised Code
as it existed prior to July 1, 1996, a violation of section 2919.23 of the Revised
Code that would have been a violation of section 2905.04 of the Revised Code as
it existed prior to July 1, 1996, had the violation been committed prior to that date,
a violation of section 2925.11 of the Revised Code that is not a minor drug
possession offense, or felonious sexual penetration in violation of former section
2907.12 of the Revised Code.
Id. § 3319.39(B)(1)(a).
33
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C. Ohio Administrative Code Section 3301-20-01: The Rehabilitation
Standards
Under the guidance of section 3319.39(E), “[t]he department of
education shall adopt rules . . . specifying circumstances under which the
board or governing authority may hire a person who has been convicted of
an offense . . . but who meets standards in regard to rehabilitation set by the
Instead of taking the opportunity to develop new
department.”37
rehabilitation standards, the Department of Education chose to continue to
use the already existing standards found in Ohio Administrative Code
section 3301-20-01.38 The purpose behind this section was to “ensure the
safety and well-being of students, and . . . establish rehabilitation
standards.”39 Under those standards, a district can employ an individual
despite the presence of a disqualifying offense if all of the following
conditions are met:
(1) The conviction was not one of the nonrehabilitative offenses defined in paragraph (A)(10)
of this rule.
(2) If the conviction is not listed in paragraph
(A)(10) of this rule the following rehabilitation
criteria shall apply:
(a) At the time of the offense, the victim . .
. was not a person under eighteen years of
age or enrolled as a student in a district.
(b) If the offense was a felony, at least five
years have elapsed since the applicant was
fully discharged from imprisonment,
probation, or parole or the applicant has had
record . . . sealed or expunged . . . . If the
offense was a misdemeanor, at least five
years have elapsed since the date of
conviction or the applicant has had the
record . . . sealed or expunged . . . .
(c) The applicant has not plead guilty to,
been found guilty by a jury or court of or
convicted of the commission of [any of the
disqualifying offenses] . . . two or more
times in separate criminal actions, with the
37

Id. § 3319.39(E).
OHIO LEGIS. SERV. COMM’N, H.B. 190: AS PASSED BY THE GEN. ASSEMBLY, H. 127, Reg. Sess.,
at 9 (2007).
39
OHIO ADMIN. CODE 3301-20-01 (2008 & Supp. 2010).
38

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol36/iss2/5

2011]

POLICING SCHOOL DISTRICTS, BUT AT WHAT EXPENSE?

exception of two or more misdemeanor
theft related convictions as defined in
sections 2913.02, 2913.03, 2913.04,
2913.11 and 2913.51 of the Revised Code .
. . . [Convictions/guilty pleas connected
to/resulting from the same act] or resulting
from offenses committed at the same time,
shall be counted as one [conviction/plea] . .
. . A sealed or expunged conviction shall
not be counted for purposes of this
paragraph.
(d) The
applicant
provides
written
confirmation of his/her efforts at
rehabilitation and the results of those efforts
....
(e) A reasonable person would conclude
that the applicant’s hiring or licensure will
not jeopardize the health, safety, or welfare
of the persons served by the district.
Evidence that the applicant’s hiring or
licensure will not jeopardize the health,
safety, or welfare of the persons served by
the district shall include, but not be limited
to the following factors:
(i) The nature and seriousness of
the crime;
(ii) The extent of the applicant’s
past criminal activity;
(iii) The age the applicant when
the crime was committed;
(iv) The amount of time that has
elapsed since the applicant’s last
criminal activity;
(v) The conduct and work activity
of the applicant before and after the
criminal activity;
(vi) Whether the applicant has
completed the terms of his
probation or deferred adjudication;
(vii) Evidence of rehabilitation;
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(viii) Whether the applicant fully
disclosed the crime to the state
board, the department and the
district;
(ix) Whether
employment
or
licensure will have a negative
impact on the local education
community;
(x) Whether
employment
or
licensure will have a negative
impact on the state-wide education
community; and
(xi) Any other factors the state
board, district, or superintendent
considers relevant.40
Though these seem to be appropriate rehabilitation standards, the
real problem comes into play with division (E)(1) and its reference to
paragraph (A)(10)’s non-rehabilitative offenses. That paragraph breaks
down the grouping of non-rehabilitative offenses into four categories. These
categories cover what the department describes as “violent offenses,”41
40
41

Id. 3301-20-01(E) (emphasis added).
These violent offenses include the following categories:
[S]ections 2903.01 (aggravated murder), 2903.02 (murder), 2903.03 (voluntary
manslaughter), 2903.04 (involuntary manslaughter), 2903.041 (reckless homicide),
2903.11 (felonious assault), 2903.12 (aggravated assault), 2903.15 (permitting
child abuse), 2905.01 (kidnapping), 2905.02 (abduction), 2905.05 (criminal child
enticement), 2905.11 (extortion), 2909.02 (aggravated arson), 2911.01 (aggravated
robbery), 2911.02 (robbery), 2911.11 (aggravated burglary), 2917.01 (inciting to
violence), 2917.02 (aggravated riot), 2917.03 (riot), 2917.31 (inducing panic),
2921.03 (intimidation), 2921.04 (intimidation of attorney, victim or witness in
criminal case), 2921.34 (escape), 2923.122 (illegal conveyance or possession of
deadly weapon or dangerous ordnance or illegal possession of an object
indistinguishable from a firearm in school safety zone), 2923.123 (illegal
conveyance of deadly weapon or dangerous ordnance into courthouse, illegal
possession or control in a courthouse), 2923.161 (improperly discharging firearm
at or into a habitation; school related offenses), 2923.21 (improperly furnishing
firearms to minor), 2923.17 (unlawful possession of dangerous ordnance; illegally
manufacturing or processing explosives) of the Revised Code; divisions (B)(1),
(2), (3), or (4) of sections 2919.22 (endangering children), 2909.22 (soliciting or
providing support for act of terrorism), 2909.23 (making terroristic threat),
2909.24 (terrorism), 2917.33 (unlawful possession or use of a hoax weapon of
mass destruction), 2927.24 (contaminating substance for human consumption or
use; contamination with hazardous chemical, biological, or radioactive substance;
spreading false report), 3716.11 (placing harmful objects in food/confection),
2921.05 (retaliation), 2919.12 (unlawful abortion), 2919.121 (performing or
inducing unlawful abortion upon minor), or 2919.13 (abortion manslaughter) of
the Revised Code, section 2919.23 (interference of custody) of the Revised Code
that would have been a violation of section 2905.04 (child stealing) of the Revised
Code as it existed prior to July 1, 1996, had the violation been committed prior to
that date, or any municipal ordinance or law of this state, another state, or the
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“[t]heft offenses and other offenses against public administration,”42 “drug
abuse offenses,”43 and “sexually-oriented offenses.”44 To put things in
context, of the approximately fifty disqualifying offenses listed in division
(B)(1) of section 3319.39, thirty-six have been deemed by the Department of
Education as being “non-rehabilitative.” This means that an employee
found to have been convicted of a disqualifying offense will automatically
be fired 72% of the time without taking anything more than the conviction
into account. It was in this important and critical act of classifying these
offenses as “non-rehabilitative” that the state legislature opened the doors to
a number of constitutional concerns and questions that will be addressed in
Section III.
D. House Bill 428: Some Steps in the Right Direction
Ohio Substitute House Bill 428 was introduced on January 9, 2008,
just two months after Substitute House Bill 190 was passed.45 It signified
United States that is substantially equivalent to the offenses listed in this
paragraph.
Id. 3301-20-01(A)(10)(a).
42
These theft offenses and other offenses against public administration include “sections 2911.12
(burglary), 2913.44 (personating an officer), 2921.41 (theft in office), 2921.11 (perjury), or 2921.02
(bribery) of the Revised Code or any municipal ordinance or law of this state, another state, or the United
States that is substantially equivalent to the offenses listed in this paragraph.” Id. 3301-20-01(A)(10)(b).
43
These drug abuse offenses include the following categories:
[S]ections 2925.02 (corrupting another with drugs), 2925.03 (trafficking in drugs),
2925.04 (illegal manufacture of drugs or cultivation of marihuana), 2925.041
(illegal assembly or possession of chemicals for the manufacture of drugs),
2925.05 (funding of drug or marihuana trafficking), 2925.06 (illegal
administration or distribution of anabolic steroids), 2925.13 (permitting drug
abuse), 2925.22 (deception to obtain a dangerous drug), 2925.23 (illegal
possession of drug documents), 2925.24 (tampering with drugs), 2925.32
(trafficking in harmful intoxicants; improperly dispensing or distributing nitrous
oxide), 2925.36 (illegal dispensing of drug samples), or 2925.37 (possession of
counterfeit controlled substances) of the Revised Code or any municipal ordinance
or law of this state, another state, or the United States that is substantially
equivalent to the offenses listed in this paragraph.
Id. 3301-20-01(A)(10)(c).
44
These sexually-oriented offenses include the following categories:
[S]ections 2907.02 (rape), 2907.03 (sexual battery), 2907.04 (unlawful sexual
conduct with a minor), 2907.05 (gross sexual imposition), 2907.06 (sexual
imposition), 2907.07 (importuning), 2907.21 (compelling prostitution), 2907.22
(promoting prostitution), 2907.23 (procuring), 2907.24 (soliciting; after positive
HIV test), 2907.241 (loitering to engage in solicitation; solicitation after positive
HIV test) 2907.25 (prostitution; after positive HIV test), 2907.31 (disseminating
matter harmful to juveniles), 2907.311 (displaying matter harmful to juveniles),
2907.32 (pandering obscenity), 2907.321 (pandering obscenity involving a minor),
2907.322 (pandering sexually oriented matter involving a minor), 2907.33
(deception to obtain matter harmful to juveniles), 2907.34 (compelling acceptance
of objectionable materials), or 2907.323 (illegal use of a minor in nudity-oriented
material or performance) of the Revised Code, a violation of former section
2907.12 (felonious sexual penetration) of the Revised Code or any municipal
ordinance or law of this state, another state, or the United States that is
substantially equivalent to the offenses listed in this paragraph.
Id. 3301-20-01(A)(10)(d).
45
OHIO LEGIS. SERV. COMM’N, H.B. 428: AS PASSED BY THE GEN. ASSEMBLY, H. 127, Reg. Sess.,
at 28 (2008).
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that, just two months after section 3319.39 was modified and section
3319.391 was enacted, the legislature already realized a need for
modification. Unfortunately, the modifications were minor; although, they
did relax some of the records checks requirements slightly. Mainly, the
amendments sought to accomplish three things: (1) ease the requirements
placed upon the record checks of contractors working in the schools; (2) set
the date for schools to perform the five-year re-checks; and (3) provide for
situations in which supplemental FBI record checks would no longer be
needed.46 The Bill was officially passed by both houses on May 28, 2008.47
To change the records check requirements for contractor employees
working in schools, the legislature, first, deleted the former division (A)(2)48
of section 3319.391.49 In order to replace the deleted language, the
legislature chose to enact section 3319.392.50 Section 3319.392 is limited,
at first, by only applying to the following:
[A]n employee of a private company under contract with a
school district . . . to provide essential school services and
who will work . . . in a position that does not require a
license . . . and that involves routine interaction with a child
or regular responsibility for the care, custody, or control of a
child.51
“Essential school services” are those necessary for operation and which
would need to be supplied by an employee, if not for the private contract.52
Then, new section goes on to say that no school shall permit an applicable
contract employee to work; however, it provides the following exceptions:
(1) The person’s employer presents proof of both of the
following to the designated official: (a) the person has been
the subject of a criminal records check . . . within the fiveyear period immediately prior to the date on which the
person will begin work . . . . (b) The criminal records check
indicates that the person has not been convicted of or
pleaded guilty to any offense described in division (B)(1) of
section 3319.39 of the Revised Code. (2) During any period
of time in which the person will have routine interaction
with a child or regular responsibility for the care, custody,
or control of a child, the designated official has arranged for
an employee of the district . . . to be in the same room . . .
46
47
48
49
50
51
52

See id. at 18-19, 22.
Id. at 28.
See supra Part II.B.
H.B. 428, 127th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2008).
Id.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3319.392(B) (West 2005 & Supp. 2010).
Id. § 3319.392(A)(2).
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or, if outdoors, to be within a thirty-yard radius . . . or to
have visual contact with the child.53
Thus, in this case, the legislature chose some instances in which to limit
required records checks and other instances in which to completely
eliminate them.
The legislature’s second task was to alter section 3319.39 to specify
instances in which a supplemental FBI records check would no longer be
required.54 Specifically, they amended division (A)(1) of that section to
state the FBI checks would not be required under the following
circumstances:
(a) The applicant is applying to be an instructor of adult
education. (b) The duties of the position . . . do not involve
routine interaction with a child or regular responsibility for
the care, custody, or control of a child . . . [or, if they do, the
applicant will be supervised by a district employee]. (c)
The applicant presents proof that the applicant has been a
resident of this state for the five-year period immediately
prior to the date upon which the criminal records check is
requested or provides evidence that within that five-year
period the superintendent has requested information about
the applicant from the federal bureau of investigation in a
criminal records check.55
It is interesting to note that, in limiting the FBI checks, the legislature chose
to reinsert the “care, custody, or control” language that it had previously
removed from other relevant sections of the Revised Code. Finally, as noted
before, the legislature amended section 3319.391 to provide September 5th
as the date on which subsequent five year checks must be completed.56
E. Revisiting the Regulations: Ohio Administrative Code Section
3301-20-03
In order to respond to the fact that background-checks legislation is
now applicable to both licensed and non-licensed employees, the
Department of Education passed promulgated section 3301-20-03 on August
27, 2009.57 This new section was designed specifically to deal with the
employment of non-licensed individuals with certain convictions.58 The
language of this new section is largely the same as that of section 3301-2053
54
55
56
57
58
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OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3319.39(A)(1).
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03, i.e. it contains a list of rehabilitation standards allowing for continued
employment so long as the disqualifying offense is not non-rehabilitative.59
However, there are some major differences in determining what is a
“non-rehabilitative offense.” Namely, this new section, again, describes
other violent offenses, including crimes such as burglary and assault, but
makes them non-rehabilitative only if they were committed within twenty
years of the applicant’s hire or background check.60 Furthermore, this new
section would make drug offenses, such as trafficking, non-rehabilitative
only if committed within the past ten years.61 Similarly, theft offenses are
only non-rehabilitative if committed within a ten-year period.62 Finally,
“other offenses” such as domestic violence and child endangerment are only
non-rehabilitative if committed within the past five years.63
While the Department of Education had the right idea to relax the
list of non-rehabilitative offenses for non-licensed school district employees,
its method for doing so seems completely arbitrary. For example, under its
new regulations, if I am a non-licensed employee undergoing a background
check in 2010, then I would have to be fired if I was found to have sold
narcotics in 2000 or found guilty of assault in 1990, but not if I was
convicted of child endangerment or domestic violence in 2004. It seems
entirely counterintuitive that in a school setting a charge of child
endangerment or domestic violence should be viewed more leniently than
past drug trafficking or assault.
While, assumingly, trying to relax the standards, the Department has
simply taken an extremely harsh rubber stamp approach dictating
disqualification, no matter when the crime was committed, and replaced it
with a new rubber stamp system guided by seemingly random timelines.
Furthermore, this new regulation did nothing to alter the already existing
section 3301-20-01’s unjust application to licensed employees.
Accordingly, despite its best intentions, the Department of Education did not
adequately address the problem with the new section 3301-20-03.
F. Pending Class Action Suits: Seeing the Effects of H.B 190 and H.B. 428
Despite H.B. 428’s attempts to relax and limit the necessity of
criminal records checks, there are still a number of pending class action suits
underway at this moment that involve long-time school employees being
released from their employment. These terminations are done primarily
through the newly enacted section 3319.391. Furthermore, these cases have
59
60
61
62
63

Id. 3301-20-03(D).
Id. 3301-20-03(A)(6)(d).
Id. 3301-20-03(A)(6)(e).
Id. 3301-20-03(A)(6)(f).
Id. 3301-20-03(A)(6)(g).
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primarily involved individuals being released without cause or without
taking into account their rehabilitation, due in large part to the nonrehabilitative offenses listed in Ohio Administrative Code section 3301-2001.
For example, Walter v. Fairfield City Schools involved at least two
identified plaintiffs who had worked for the district for twenty-two years
and six years respectively.64 The first plaintiff was the head custodian, and
in 1971 had been convicted for the sale of marijuana, with the conviction
eventually expunged in 1981.65 Due to section 3319.391, this plaintiff was
informed of his impending termination and was forced to retire ahead of
schedule, resulting in significant economic loss.66 The second plaintiff had
been convicted thirty-five years earlier, at the age of eighteen, for burglary,
a fact that he had disclosed to the district upon his hiring.67 This plaintiff
refused to resign his position, and, as a result, was terminated.68
Doe v. Cincinnati Public Schools Board of Education involves
similar tragic circumstances.69 In that case, the plaintiff had been employed
by the defendant for eleven years, initially as a “Safe & Drug Free School
Specialist” and then as a “due process hearing specialist.”70 The plaintiff
was convicted of the unlawful sale of narcotics in 1976, and served three
years in a correctional facility, during which time he was rehabilitated,
obtained a B.S. in psychology, and became a licensed social worker and
certified chemical dependency counselor.71 Despite his years of service and
successful life-changing turnaround, this plaintiff, like those in Walter, was
notified that he would be fired in November of 2008.72
These examples represent just a few of the numerous class action
suits being filed right now in opposition to H.B. 190 and section 3319.391
of the Revised Code. They are representative of the fact that after the
enactment of this damaging legislation, many rehabilitated former offenders
were forced out of their jobs due to the legislature’s determination that their
crimes were “non-rehabilitative.” Surely, as time passes, the number of
such suits will continue to grow until action is taken to prevent these
unnecessarily harmful consequences.

64
Complaint ¶¶ 1-2, Walter v. Fairfield City Sch., No. 109CV00462, 2009 WL 2863604 (S.D. Ohio
July 2, 2009).
65
Id. ¶¶ 8, 10.
66
Id. ¶ 10.
67
Id. ¶¶ 12-14.
68
Id. ¶ 15.
69
See Complaint ¶¶ 7-26, Doe v. Cincinnati Pub. Sch. Bd. of Educ., No. 1:09-CV-243, 2009 WL
1947484 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 24, 2009).
70
Id. ¶ 7.
71
Id. ¶¶ 19-23.
72
Id. ¶ 12.
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II. ARGUMENT
Taken as a whole, the Revised Code and Administrative Rules
surrounding H.B. 190 cannot stand as written. Not only does the current
wording in many cases reach unconstitutional results, but the wording itself
is at points vague and ambiguous. The most important area that needs to be
addressed is the rehabilitation standards that are currently in place. While
the Department of Education was given a chance to revise and edit these
rules, it has consistently used the same outdated and ineffective rules. The
biggest issue within these standards is the fact that the Department sees it fit
to declare some offenses non-rehabilitative. Effectively, through this act, it
has determined that individuals falling within the disqualifying offenses will
automatically be terminated roughly 72% of the time without taking into
consideration their lives led and the time passed since the conviction.
In sum, something must be done now, or else we will be forcing
truly rehabilitated individuals that are benefiting their surrounding
community out of their positions without any rational cause. This could
lead to a destruction of their home environments, as well as a rise in
recidivism in the justice system by giving the individuals no other option but
to possibly revert back to crime.
This Section will now examine the inherent textual problems in the
legislation, followed by an examination of the constitutional issues that it
will raise. In order to develop possible solutions, this Section will also
examine similar systems currently in place in other states and see how their
approaches have avoided the constitutional problems found within Ohio’s
system.
A. Inherent Textual Ambiguities
The first problem presented by the newly enacted section 3319.39 is
its ambiguous language when read together with Ohio Administrative Code
section 3301-20-01. Under section 3319.391, those convicted of a
disqualifying offense shall be released from employment, “unless the person
meets the rehabilitation standards adopted by the department [of education]
However, the Board of Education
under [R.C. § 3319.39](E).”73
disregarded the duty to adopt new rules, and there have not been any new
standards for rehabilitation of licensed employees that have been put in
place since the 2007 legislation.74 Instead, without statutory authorization,
the Board applied the old rule in the form of Ohio Administrative Code
section 3301-20-01.75 These rules have not been amended since 2004, quite
some time before section 3319.391 was even thought of, and before
73
74
75

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3319.391(C) (West 2005 & Supp. 2010).
OHIO ADMIN. CODE 3301-20-01 (2008 & Supp. 2010).
Id.
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employees were being terminated for past convictions.76
Furthermore, the plain meaning of the language of the Board’s old
rule does not even apply to current employees. The language used
throughout the rule clearly states that it applies only to applicants.77 The
rule itself plainly states that an “‘applicant’ does not include a person
currently employed by a district.”78
As is apparent, the plain meaning of the text indicates that by
extending Ohio Administrative Code section 3301-20-01 to those
individuals affected by section 3319.391, the State is exceeding its own
rules. The use of the language between the statute and the regulation is
inherently ambiguous and misleading because they seem to apply to two
different classes of people. This shows that new rehabilitation standards
must be formed not only to avoid the constitutional issues but because, as
written, the text and its application are in opposition.
B. State and Federal Constitutional Issues
One of the key concerns raised by the new legislation and the
corresponding regulations is the host of constitutional issues that they
present on both the state and federal levels. For the purposes of this section,
it is important to note at the outset that under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 individuals
have a private cause of action if they are deprived, under the color of state
law, of rights secured to them by the Constitution.79 Therefore, as the state
undertakes to terminate employees under section 3319.391 and in
accordance with the regulations imposed by the Board of Education, said
employees will be able to enforce the denial of their constitutional rights
directly against the state actors under a § 1983 claim—because the Board of
Education is a state actor acting under a state law to condone their actions.
Therefore, if something is not done now, then the State will continue to see
a multitude of lawsuits brought for impairment of the following
constitutional guarantees.
1. Violation of the Contracts Clause
The Constitution of the United States dictates that “[n]o State shall .
. . pass any . . . law impairing the Obligation of Contracts.”80 This idea is
further captured under the Ohio Constitution, which states, “[t]he general
assembly shall have no power to pass . . . laws impairing the obligation of
contracts.”81 It has been established that to demonstrate a violation of the
76
77
78
79
80
81
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contracts clause the proponent must show “that a change in state law has
operated as a substantial impairment of a contractual relationship.”82 Once
it has been determined that a “substantial impairment” exists, then the court
is to investigate whether or not the impairment was “reasonable and
appropriate in the service of a legitimate and important public purpose.”83
Courts have also found it important to note that when the law in question
directly affects the state’s own obligation, “complete deference to a
legislative assessment of reasonableness and necessity is not appropriate
because the state’s self-interest is at stake.”84
Section 3319.391 is clearly impairing the written contracts between
the Ohio Public School districts and their employees. In many cases it is
causing the automatic forfeiture of the employee’s position without any real
consideration into his or her character or rehabilitation. It seems apparent
that this is exactly the type of substantial impairment that the courts have
chosen to address. Therefore, the question must turn on the appropriateness
of this impairment in the furtherance of a legitimate state interest.
There can be no doubt that the legislature’s interest in providing the
utmost protection for students in public schools is legitimate. However, the
impairment imposed by this new statute can hardly be deemed rational and
appropriate. The legislature may have created what it believed was a
reasonable solution, but, as previously mentioned, one should be wary to
resort solely to the legislature’s notion in a state-interested impairment such
as this one.
Looking at the facts of some of the aforementioned suits, the
irrationality should become readily apparent. In many cases, individuals are
being forced out of work after years of faithful and well-reviewed service,
having never threatened the safety or well-being of any members of the
student body. Also, they are being terminated without any consideration of
the totality of the circumstances in each individual case.85 Finally, the fact
that this rubber stamp approach is ultimately requiring termination for an
incident that, in many cases, occurred years before the individual’s
employment even began and numerous years before the law was passed,
should cause the impairment to be seen as unreasonable.
In conclusion, as written, section 3319.391 and the corresponding
regulations are raising serious concerns about the impairment of the
contracts clauses of both the state and federal Constitutions. This
demonstrates the need for change in the law.
82
Quick Commc’ns, Inc. v. Michigan Bell Tel. Co., 515 F.3d 581, 587 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting
Mascio v. Pub. Emps. Ret. Sys. of Ohio, 160 F.3d 310, 313 (6th Cir. 1998)).
83
United States v. Cnty. of Muskegon, 298 F.3d 569, 584 (6th Cir. 2002).
84
U.S. Trust Co. of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 25-26 (1977).
85
See supra Part II.E.
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2. Violation Against State Retroactivity Prohibition
Section 3319.391, as enacted through H.B. 190, is also likely to be
found unconstitutionally retroactive. Under the Ohio Constitution, “[t]he
general assembly shall have no power to pass retroactive laws . . . .”86 The
Ohio Supreme Court has even gone on record stating that the protection
provided by this section is greater than that provided by the federal Ex Post
Facto Clause.87 Courts have developed a two-part test to determine if the
statute is retroactive.88 The first step is a judicial determination as to
whether there was a clear indication on the part of the General Assembly
that they intended the statute to apply retrospectively.89 If the first question
is answered affirmatively, then the court must determine whether the statute
is substantive or remedial.90 If this final question is answered with a finding
that the statute is substantive, then it will be found to be unconstitutionally
retroactive.91
Looking at the text of the statute, it seems readily clear that the
legislature intended a retroactive application. The statute plainly states,
“[f]or each person to whom this division applies who is hired prior to
November 14, 2007, the employer shall request a criminal records check.”92
The statute then goes to say that “[a]ny person who . . . has been convicted
of or pleaded guilty to any offense described in division (B)(1) of section
3319.39 of the Revised Code shall not be hired or shall be released from
employment.”93 Taking these sections together, the plain meaning of this
language clearly denotes that the legislature intended a retroactive
application.
Section 3319.391 is a substantive law because it affects a vested
right. As the Ohio Supreme Court stated, “[u]pon principle, every statute,
which takes away or impairs vested rights acquired under existing laws, or
creates a new obligation, imposes a new duty, or attaches a new disability,
in respect to transactions or considerations already past, must be deemed
retrospective.”94 Ohio courts have already determined employees of the city
have a vested right in their public employment.95 As employees of city
public school districts, those affected by this law possess the same vested
right in their employment within the school system.
86

OHIO CONST. art. II, § 28.
Van Fossen v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 522 N.E.2d 489, 498 (Ohio 1988).
Id. at 494-95.
89
Id.
90
Id.
91
Id. at 496.
92
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3319.391(A) (West 2005 & Supp. 2010).
93
Id. § 3319.391(C).
94
State ex rel. Matz v. Brown, 525 N.E.2d 805, 807 (Ohio 1988) (quoting Herrick v. Lindley, 391
N.E.2d 729, 732 (Ohio 1979)).
95
See Fraternal Order of Police Youngstown Lodge No. 28 v. Hunter, 360 N.E.2d 708, 714-18
(Ohio Ct. App. 1975).
87
88
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The existence of this vested right and the judicially accepted
definition previously stated make it clear that section 3319.391 is a
substantive law. Therefore, it is obvious that in satisfying the judicially
developed two-part test, section 3319.391 is unconstitutionally retroactive.
3. Violation of Ex Post Facto Restriction
Section 3319.391 is also unconstitutional as a clear example of an
ex post facto law. The United States Constitution prohibits any passage of
ex post facto laws.96 The U.S. Supreme Court has stated that the ex post
facto clause was designed to prohibit legislative enactments that “change[]
the punishment, and inflict[] a greater punishment, than the law annexed to
the crime, when committed.”97 The Supreme Court has also stated that, “[i]f
the intention of the legislature was to impose punishment, that ends the
inquiry. If, however, the intention was to enact a regulatory scheme that is
civil and nonpunitive, we must further examine whether the statutory
scheme is ‘so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate [an] intention
to deem it civil.’”98
Based on the foregoing principles, if the legislature intended to
punish those who are employed or seeking employment in the school
districts for past offenses, then there is no need for further investigation, and
the statute is unconstitutional as against the ex post facto prohibition.
However, it is unlikely that this is what the legislature intended, and, indeed,
there is no documented proof to that fact. Section 3319.391 is still
unconstitutional because of its punitive effect. Courts have developed a
process to determine if the statute has a punitive effect and look to whether
the imposed obligations are traditionally regarded as punishment, operate as
a disability or restraint, further traditional notions of punishment, bear a
rational connection to a non-punitive purpose, or are excessive in relation to
the alternative purposes assigned.99
Section 3319.391 clearly has a punitive effect, overriding any
attempt to deem it civil. It is clearly punishing to those affected by it in that
it prevents them from working in any school district within the state. In the
same sense, it is more obviously operating as an overwhelming disability or
restraint. The statute clearly furthers traditional notions of punishment,
which is defined by its plain meaning as the act of punishing or “impos[ing]
a penalty on for a fault.”100 Those affected committed a fault when they
committed the original disqualifying offense in the past, and the State is
96

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423, 429 (1987).
98
Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 92 (2003) (quoting United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248-49
(1980)).
99
Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 369 (1986); Ward, 448 U.S. at 247-48 n.7.
100
MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 947 (10th ed. 1993).
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imposing a clear penalty by disqualifying them from further employment
with their established employer. The procedures set forth are also extremely
excessive in the furtherance of the goal of child safety. By deeming the
majority of the disqualifying offenses as non-rehabilitative and ending any
further inquiry into whether the individual is actually going to affect the
safety of the students, the state is exceeding its goal. Per se, rubber stamp
rules do not necessarily have the best interest of the children in mind, and,
certainly, do not have the best interest of the employees in mind.
In summary, section 3319.391 clearly has a punitive effect. It is
adding a new punishment to crimes that did not exist when they were
committed, and is, therefore, an unconstitutional violation of the ex post
facto prohibition.
4. Violation of Equal Protection
Section 3319.391 is also unconstitutional as a violation of
constitutionally guaranteed equal protection under the law. Courts have
noted that if classifications in statutes “neither proceed[] along suspect lines
nor infringe[] fundamental constitutional rights, [the classifications] must be
upheld against equal protection challenge if there is any reasonably
conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the
classification.”101
Furthermore, the state “may make reasonable
classifications . . . provided the classification is not unreasonable, arbitrary
or capricious.”102
In this case, even under the lowest scrutiny of rational basis review,
the Department of Education has made an irrational classification between
those that can rehabilitate and those that cannot. The state likely deemed it
rational that those convicted of certain crimes were more dangerous to the
student body than those convicted of others. However, when looking at the
list of crimes it hardly seems rational to say that one convicted of assault can
rehabilitate but someone convicted of inducing panic may not.103
Furthermore, when discussing the relationship between a crime committed
many years ago and behavior today, the U.S. Supreme Court has even said
that the relationship is “so attenuated as to render the distinction arbitrary or
irrational.”104
When looking at recidivism in general, there is also data available
that helps to eliminate any rational basis for the proposition that someone
convicted of a crime many years ago is more likely to commit further crimes
101

F.C.C. v. Beach Commc’ns., Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993).
Gilday v. Bd. of Elections of Hamilton Cnty., Ohio, 472 F.2d 214, 217 (6th Cir. 1972).
See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3319.39(B)(1)(a) (West 2005 & Supp. 2010); OHIO ADMIN. CODE
3301-20-01 (A)(10) (2008 & Supp. 2010).
104
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 446 (1985).
102
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today. For example, a recent study conducted by the National Institute of
Justice compared recidivism rates of first time offenders with the probability
of arrest for those who have no criminal record.105 When looking at
eighteen-year-old first time offenders, the chance of another arrest goes
down as time passes, and within eight years is equal to that of the general
population.106 According to the study, as more time passes, the first-time
offender is actually less likely to commit another offense than a member of
the public is to commit a first offense.107
In addition to these considerations, there are a number of courts
across the country that have rejected broad rules that bar employment
because of criminal convictions. One court held that a broad exclusion
denying city employment for felons violated equal protection because it was
“not tailored along any lines to conform to what might be considered
legitimate government interests.”108 A statute in Iowa that denied civil
service positions to felons was struck down on equal protection grounds
because the court could not accept the “across-the-board prohibition.”109
Similarly, a Connecticut statute denying felons positions as private
detectives or security guards was struck down as against equal protection.110
The court reasoned that “[t]he critical defect . . . is [the rule’s] over breadth .
. . the statutes across-the-board disqualification fails to consider probable
and realistic circumstances in a felon’s life, including the likelihood of
rehabilitation, age at the time of conviction, and other mitigating
circumstances.”111
Section 3319.391 and Ohio Administrative Code section 3301-2001 are making these same across-the-board restrictions. Although there are
rehabilitation standards stated, by making the list of non-rehabilitative
offenses so arbitrarily over-inclusive the Board is being far too broad in its
employment ban.
For all of the foregoing principles, section 3319.391, in conjunction
with the administrative rules, is unconstitutional as a violation of equal
protection.
5. Violation of Due Process
Section 3319.391 is also an unconstitutional violation of both
105
Alfred Blumstein & Kiminori Nakamura, ‘Redemption’ In An Era of Widespread Criminal
Background Checks, 263 NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE 10, 11 (2009), http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/
226872.pdf.
106
Id. at 12.
107
Id.
108
Kindem v. City of Almaeda, 502 F. Supp. 1108, 1112 (N.D. Cal. 1980).
109
Butts v. Nichols, 381 F. Supp. 573, 580 (S.D. Iowa 1974).
110
Smith v. Fussenich, 440 F. Supp. 1077, 1081 (D. Conn. 1977).
111
Id. at 1080.
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procedural and substantive due process rights. To achieve success on a
substantive due process claim involving a non-fundamental right, a plaintiff
has the burden of proving that the government’s action “shock[ed] the
conscious.”112 In regards to this standard, the U.S. Supreme Court has stated
that “conduct intended to injure in some way unjustifiable by any
government interest is the sort of official action most likely to rise to the
conscience-shocking level.”113
For the various reasons explained previously, the actions and
distinctions made by the government are so irrational as to clearly shock the
conscious. The state’s action was intended to injure those affected by
denying them gainful employment and its total irrationality renders it
unjustifiable under any government interest.
Under the procedural aspect of the Due Process Clause of the
Constitution, certain processes must be provided before the government can
deprive an individual of life, liberty, or property. 114 Public employment has
been officially recognized as a protected property interest under the Due
Process Clause.115
Applying this concept to the current situation, school district
employees have a property interest in their continued employment. Section
3319.391 is depriving them of that without any process whatsoever; those
terminated in accordance with its guidance are provided with no process by
which to challenge the firing.116 The statute describes no procedures for
appealing or fighting a termination, making the decision final and leaving
the dismissed without recourse.117 Accordingly, those fired are being denied
any sort of procedural due process.
Because section 3319.391 denies those convicted of an enumerated
offense, especially those convicted of a “non-rehabilitative offense,” of both
substantive and procedural due process, it should be found unconstitutional
as a violation of the Due Process Clause of the Constitution.
6. Doe v. Ronan: Testing the Constitutional Limits
To date, there has only been one case to reach a decision as to the
constitutionality of Revised Code section 3319.391, and that was Doe v.
Ronan, which was decided October 26, 2010.118 That case involved John
Doe, a petitioner convicted of drug trafficking in 1976, whose July 2008
112
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contract with Cincinnati Public School was terminated in November of that
year as a result of Revised Code section 33919.391.119 This case worked its
way through the court system, and reached the Ohio Supreme Court on two
certified questions as to Revised Code section 3319.391’s retroactivity and
impairment of contracts.120
As for the contract clause issue, the court noted several rules to
guide its decision. First, “contracts entered into on or after the effective
date of [a statute] are subject to the provisions of that statute.”121 With this
in mind the court stated, “[w]hen an employment contract . . . is made
pursuant to these statutes, the contract must be construed as though the
statutes are incorporated into the contract and become implied terms and
conditions of any contract or contractual right.”122 Accordingly, the court
found that Doe was only conditionally employed until satisfaction of section
3319.391’s background check, as that law was already effective at the time
of his contract.123 In so finding, the court held that the contract did not ever
become binding, and, hence, could not have been impaired as a result of
Revised Code section 3319.391; therefore, there was no contracts clause
issue.124
Although the court in this case upheld the law against a contracts
clause challenge, the decision was very fact sensitive. In this instance, the
contract was entered into after the effective date of Revised Code section
3319.391; therefore, invoking the aforementioned rules of law. However, as
mentioned previously, the law is also, and in the future could be, used to
terminate individuals whose contracts were entered into prior to the
effective date of Revised Code section 3319.391. Had this been the
situation in Ronan, the court could not have invoked the rules implying the
terms of the law into the contract, and the result likely would have changed.
Once a case reaches a decision involving a contract entered into prior to
Revised Code section 3319.391’s effective date, then the true
constitutionality will be tested.
As for the retroactivity of the law, the court erroneously determined
that Revised Code section 3319.391 is “prospective in application” and
“does not go back to the date of the employee’s initial hire, terminate that
person effective as of the hire date, and eliminate any of that person’s
accrued benefits.”125 The court, instead, viewed the law as only prohibiting
conduct occurring after the effective date, i.e. continuing to employ a
119
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disqualified individual.126 Accordingly, the court did not find the law
unconstitutionally retroactive.127
However, Justice Brown wrote a strong dissent more logically
analyzing the issue, and he found that the law was unconstitutionally
retroactive. To begin, Brown points out that “the majority holds that Doe
loses . . . his otherwise viable constitutional right based upon terms of the
contract that were added to the contract by [the] court by implication.”128
Brown, himself, would conclude that “[he] cannot agree to so casually
dispose of Doe’s constitutional claims through the use of a legal artifice
(contract terms implied in law).”129
What was critical and relevant in Brown’s mind was that Revised
Code section 3319.391 required termination from valid employment based
on an individual’s past conduct.130 He then went on to point out the
established rule that “laws are unconstitutionally retroactive when they
impair a vested right based upon prior conduct.”131 Again, pointing out that
public employees have a vested right to continued employment, Justice
Brown would have held that Revised Code section 3319.391 violated the
constitutional provision prohibiting retroactive laws.132
In the end, Doe v. Ronan did uphold the law as constitutional. But
what we are left with is a fact-sensitive contract clause issue and a poorly
decided and strongly dissented retroactivity issue. Ultimately, due to this
crippling law, we are left with a good employee out of a job. As the
majority, itself, pointed out, “[t]he effect . . . on Doe’s career is regrettable.
Doe’s past experiences and rehabilitation appear to have made him
especially qualified for the duties of the position for which he was hired.”133
However, despite its recognition of the problem, the court was bound by
poor lawmaking.
C. Solutions: Looking at Other States’ Systems
After considering all of the aforementioned problems, it is clear that
something must be done to address the negative implications of the current
system of background checks used by the Ohio Public School districts. As
guidance for addressing these problems, it would aid Ohio’s legislators to
look to other states and see how their systems of background checks avoid
many of the textual and constitutional problems raised by Ohio’s current
126
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scheme. While the following examples are only selective of a few states,
they clearly present methods that would better serve the state and protect the
rights guaranteed to its citizens.
By looking to the background check system of our southern
neighbor, Kentucky, one can already see many simple ways to avoid
constitutional problems. For example, under Kentucky’s statutes, a public
school superintendant is only required to conduct a background check on all
“initial hires.”134 If language such as this was employed in Ohio it would
help to clear up many of the issues involving unconstitutional retroactivity.
No longer would employees hired long before the legislation was even
enacted be fired after years of productive, well-received service.
Furthermore, Kentucky only mandates automatic termination for
those convicted of the worst violent offenses and felony sex crimes.135
Michigan, our northern neighbor, follows a similar practice. Under their
statutory system, automatic termination is only required if a background
check uncovers a violation of a “listed offense.”136 The statute goes on to
define a “listed offense” as a violation of an enumerated offense found
within the State’s sex offender registration act.137 Again, Michigan has
chosen to focus on automatic dismissal for serious sexual offenses. These
statutory offenses are a far cry from Ohio’s seemingly laundry list of
aforementioned “non-rehabilitative offenses” that carry with them
mandatory dismissal.138 By focusing on terminations for truly heinous
crimes, as is done in Kentucky and Michigan, Ohio could better meet their
burden of showing a rational relationship to the state interest of protecting
its student population. This, in turn, would help to protect the legislation
from constitutional attacks on equal protection and substantive due process
grounds.
While Kentucky’s background check requirements focus on initial
hires, looking at its analogous procedures for post-hire terminations sheds
light on other possible remedies for the constitutional flaws in Ohio’s
system. Kentucky’s statutes detail the procedures to be followed for
constructively terminating employees by revoking their required
certificates.139 These guidelines, again, limit the list of disqualifying
offenses to felonies and other specific offenses dealing with minors.140
Another key aspect of Kentucky’s system is its use of the discretionary
language “may revoke.”141 This discretionary approach, as opposed to
134
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Ohio’s mandatory approach, will allow the school to consider the
employee’s rehabilitation in all situations, and it makes the conviction,
itself, just one aspect of the totality of the circumstances considered in
school employment decisions. Again, this discretionary approach would
help the statutes pass the constitutional rational basis touchstone.
Kentucky has also done far more to allow the employees an
adequate procedure to defend themselves. Under Kentucky’s post-hire
disciplinary system, before a constructive termination is carried out, the
Education Professional Standards Board must first conduct a hearing.142
Furthermore, the employee may appeal the Board’s decision in a state
circuit court.143 By allowing the employee to defend against the decision in
a judicial forum, Kentucky has assured that it will avoid procedural due
process violations. The same cannot be said in Ohio, where school district
employees have no redress from the Board’s decision.144
Overall, the ideal general approach to constitutionally furthering the
state’s interest, while protecting those of the employee, can be found in
North Carolina’s approach:
The local board of education shall review the criminal
history it receives on a person. The local board shall
determine whether the results of the review indicate that the
applicant or employee (i) poses a threat to the physical
safety of students or personnel, or (ii) has demonstrated that
he or she does not have the integrity or honesty to fulfill his
or her duties as public school personnel and shall use the
information when making employment decisions.145
This is truly the best approach that a state could take. This approach
epitomizes the best method in that it makes a person’s criminal record just
one piece of the puzzle. It mandates no automatic terminations, and allows
for the achievement of actually balancing the important interests involved.
It also leaves open the ability to equally consider the employee’s
rehabilitation in all circumstances, not just a select few.
In conclusion, Ohio would be better served by modeling its
background check system after those of other states. By viewing the results
of the checks as just one factor in the total mix, and by implementing due
process and retroactive safeguards, the state could still achieve its overall
objectives and not raise any constitutional problems.
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III. CONCLUSION
The background check requirements currently in place in Ohio’s
public school system cannot remain unchanged. Not only does the current
system contain numerous textual ambiguities, but it also raises many
constitutional problems. By terminating employees based on irrational
guidelines, the state is attempting to police schools at the expense of its
citizens. These procedures will lead to many negative outcomes, both now
and in the future. Primarily, the state is not necessarily keeping the best
interests of the students in mind and is perpetuating a system that will likely
lead to increased criminal recidivism and other harmful results.
By arbitrarily placing burdens on the schools, the guidelines will, in
certain cases, lead to the rejection of certain candidates for positions that
will better serve the students’ best interests. As already documented in the
pending class action suits, the current procedure has led to the discharge of
highly qualified individuals. Many of these people have worked to turn
their lives around since their convictions and have been employed for the
schools for many years, garnering high performance reviews.146 Yet, the
current system would have the state disregard the lives these citizens have
led since their convictions and force schools to rubber-stamp their
termination. This system places the added burden on schools to turn away
what have proven to be qualified employees, and undergo new hiring
processes at their own expense.
The students themselves are suffering because the state has taken it
upon itself to say that someone convicted of an offense decades earlier is
unable to serve the best interests of the students, despite documented
evidence to the contrary. Unfortunately, this will lead to the deterioration of
the bonds formed between the students and these employees. Once that
bond is gone and the students are forced to become accustomed to a new
employee, the trust and support that once existed will no longer be present.
This could lead to delays or outright stoppages in the students’ educational
growth and development.
Furthermore, by increasing unemployment through its blanket
firings, the state’s actions will likely lead to increased recidivism in the
criminal justice system. A recent report prepared by the Ohio Department
of Rehabilitation and Correction on behalf of Governor Strickland
recognized that “an association exists between adult offender unemployment
and recidivism.”147 The report further stated that “offenders [sic] themselves
consider that securing employment is important to maintaining a crime free
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existence upon release.”148 Furthermore, a study by the U.S. Sentencing
Commission showed that for all except the highest criminal history
categories, those who are unemployed have roughly a 13% better chance of
recidivating than those who are employed.149
This data clearly shows that as school employees are being forced
out of their jobs by the current background check requirements, they will
have an increased chance of recidivating. This will consequently cause an
increased strain on Ohio’s already overworked criminal justice system as
individuals that were previously gainfully employed are being forced back
into unemployment; thus, increasing the chances that they may falter and
incur further convictions. By working to encourage the employment of
qualified ex-offenders the state can significantly avoid this excess burden.
In conclusion, it is time for the Ohio legislature to revisit the
background check system currently in force and implemented through Ohio
Revised Code section 3319.391. The current system has too many inherent
flaws for the legislature to stand by and do nothing. Not only is the text of
the legislation itself fundamentally flawed, but as it stands it is open to
constitutional challenges that may, in the near future, lead to findings of
unconstitutional results. Also, the burdens arising from the current scheme
extend beyond the actual employees to the students, school system, and
State as a whole. If the legislature can take the time to realize their error and
revisit the legislation while looking to other states for guidance, then the
proper balance can be found promoting the overall welfare of the state for
our and future generations.
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